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THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE IN
ILLINOIS: BURYING THE DEAD
TAYLOR MATTIS*
DAVID SCHELLENBERG**

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of worthier title directs that a limitation in an inter vivos conveyance to the grantor's heirs creates no interest in the
grantor's heirs, but rather retains an interest in the grantor. The
interest retained would be a future interest, a reversion, for the limitation to the grantor's heirs would follow a particular estate limited
to another.' The heirs of the grantor would ultimately take only if
the grantor died intestate still owning the reversion.'
The doctrine has suffered a somewhat stormy history in Illinois.
Recently, the Supreme Court summarized its status, after noting
that because of the court's holding on another issue
the doctrine [of worthier title] is not relevant and therefore we need
not reach the other issues briefed before this court: whether the doctrine is a rule of construction or rule of law and whether the doctrine
is an anachronism which should be abandoned in the case of trusts
established
in Illinois prior to our 1955 statutory abolition of the
3
doctrine.

The doctrine of worthier title has been applied in Illinois both
as a rule of construction, indicating the intent of the grantor, and as
a positive rule of law, operating independently of the grantor's intent. The Illinois General Assembly seemingly abolished the doc* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; J.D., University
of Miami School of Law; LL.M., Yale University; Member of the bars of Florida and
Illinois.
** J.D., Southern Illinois University School of Law.
1. An inter vivos grantor would rarely purport to make a direct gift of a present
possessory estate "to my heirs," intended in the technical sense. Nemo est haeres
viventis. If a grantor did make such a conveyance, it would be a nullity, failing for
want of a grantee, and the grantor would retain a fee simple absolute, or the same
estate he had before. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.19 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
The rule might give rise to a possibility of reverter on a limitation of an executory interest to the grantor's heirs, as well as to a reversion on a limitation of a remainder to his heirs. Id.
2. Id.
3. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Beach, 118 Ill. 2d 1, 20, 513 N.E.2d 833, 843
(1987).
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trine by statute in 1955." However, the Appellate Court of Illinois
has refused to apply the statute to extinguish the doctrine as a rule
of construction.' As a result, the status of the doctrine is uncertain
despite its apparent statutory abolition. Furthermore, there no
longer appears to be any reason for retaining the doctrine. To promote certainty in conveyancing and to give effect to the intention of
the grantor, the doctrine of worthier title should be totally
abolished.
This article will examine the Illinois cases on the doctrine of
worthier title, concentrating on whether the doctrine was applied as
a rule of law or construction.' Next, this article will discuss the statute abolishing the doctrine in the context of the courts' treatment of
the rule to determine the current status of the doctrine. Finally, the
policy considerations surrounding the doctrine will be analyzed to
create a foundation for abrogating the common-law rule in cases applying pre-statute law, and for extinguishing any of the vestiges of
the rule in cases applying the statutory abolition.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE RULE IN ILLINOIS

A.

The Doctrine of Worthier Title at Common Law
The feudal policy of the doctrine of the worthier title quite possibly originated with a thirteenth century statute voiding a conveyance by the tenant to his eldest son and heir apparent.7 The statute
4. 1955 Ill. Laws 498; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
188-89 (1987). The statute states:
Where a deed, will or other instrument purports to create any present or future interest in real or personal property in the heirs of the maker of the instrument, the heirs shall take, by purchase and not by descent, the interest
that the instrument purports to create. The doctrine of worthier title and the
rule of the common law that a grantor cannot create a limitation in favor of his
own heirs are abolished.
This Act shall apply only to instruments which become effective after the effective date of this Act.
Id.

5. Stewart v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Aurora, 3 Ill. App. 3d 337, 340-41, 278
N.E.2d 10, 13-14 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 88-90 for a discussion of
this case.
6. Where the doctrine of worthier title was a rule of law, as it was under English law, it applied to real property interests and operated without regard to the
intent of the transferor. Indeed, the common law assumed that the transferor intended the heirs to take under the transfer (to avoid feudal "inheritance taxes"), but
said that he could not do so. A. GULLIVER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS

94-95 (1959).

Where the doctrine is a rule of construction, it applies to real or personal property interests and supposedly operates to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the
transferor. Id. at 97. Indeed, all rules of construction are subservient to that purpose.
R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 41 (3d ed. 1981).
When the doctrine of worthier title is used as a rule of construction, it creates a
rebuttable presumption that a provision for the heirs of the transferor does not show
an intent to give them any interest. A. GULLIVER, supra, at 97.
7. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 151-52 (1962)
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was passed to preserve for the feudal overlord the lucrative feudal
incidents including relief, wardship, and marriage associated with
the descent of real property.8 Remainders developed in the next century. It is assumed that the doctrine of worthier title arose at that
time to protect those very same interests."
In its most basic form, the rule as applied to inter vivos transfers came to mean that a grantor cannot create a remainder or an
executory interest in his own heirs.10 If a grantor attempted to convey a future interest to his heirs, the common law treated that attempt as merely confirming a reversion in the grantor.11 The rule
was applied as a positive law of property and operated regardless of
the grantor's intent so that the heirs took nothing by virtue of the
conveyance. 12 Thus, if A conveys a life estate to B, with a remainder
to A's heirs, the true status of title is a life estate in B and a reversion in A." The doctrine of worthier title operates on the "remainder" to A's heirs at law and holds it void.
At common law the doctrine of worthier title comprised not
only an inter vivos branch but also a testamentary branch. 4 The
testamentary branch of the doctrine of worthier title directed that a
devise to a person was a nullity if that person was in fact the heir of
the testator. Since title acquired by inheritance was "worthier" than
title acquired by devise, the heir took by descent. The testamentary
branch applied whether the purported limitation was either a present or future interest. However, it applied only if the heir took an
estate of the same quantity and quality as that which would descend
absent the purported limitation." In such a case it should make no
difference in modern law, to the heirs or anyone else, whether heirs
take by devise or by inheritance. Hence, the testamentary branch of
the doctrine is obsolete, 6 and will be referred to in this study only
(citing in support, the Statute of Fraudulent Feoffments, 1267, 52 Hen. 3, ch. 6).
8. Id. at 152 n.1. At one time in English history feudal tenure existed between
an heir who took by descent and his ancestor's lord. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1601 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1987). Feudal tenure did not exist if
the heir took by purchase as an inter vivos transferee. Id.
9. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 152; L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS § 26 (2d ed. 1966) ("That is to say, if the heir could take by purchase,
then such valuable incidents of feudal tenure as wardship and primer seisen would
not accrue to the lord when the tenant's estate passed to his heir.").
10. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 150; S. KURTZ & H. HOVENKAMP, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 316 (1987).
11. Comment, Limitation to the Heirs of a Settlor, 34 U. ILL. L. REV. 835 (1940)
[hereinafter Comment Heirs of a Settlor].
12.

See H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, ILLINOIS LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 124

(1941).
13. This example is taken from C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 149-50.
14. Id. at 153-55.
15. McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 Ill. 391, 59 N.E.2d 811 (1945); S. KURTZ & H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 317.
16. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.19 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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incidentally.
Whether the doctrine of worthier title applies to inter vivos
conveyances, however, can make a tremendous difference in determining who takes, not just how they take. The inter vivos branch
has enjoyed considerable attention in the United States as a result
of Judge Cardozo's opinion in Doctor v. Hughes.17 In Hughes, a settlor conveyed real property to a trustee to hold in trust for the settlor, and upon the latter's death to convey (if not sold) the trust
property to his heirs at law. The settlor's apparent heirs at the time
of the action were his two daughters. One of these daughters had
conveyed her interest in the trust to her husband, and creditors of
the couple sought to reach that remainder.
The Appellate Division found a reversion in the settlor by reading the trust instrument as merely unnecessarily directing the trustee to convey to those who would inherit in the absence of such a
conveyance, and not disposing of the entire fee.' 8 The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the doctrine of worthier title still existed and was to be applied absent a clear expression to the contrary. These opinions appear consistent, and when read together
were interpreted as initiating the concept of the doctrine as a rule of
construction. 9 Thus, the New York rule became that where the
grantor uses language purporting to create a remainder in his own
heirs, there is a rebuttable presumption that the grantor intended to
keep a reversion.'
B.

Treatment of the Doctrine of Worthier Title in Illinois Prior
to the Statutory Abolition
There were only nine Illinois decisions before the 1955 statutory

The last Illinois cases dealing with the testamentary branch of the doctrine of
worthier title were McNeilly v. Wylie and Boldenweck v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co,, discussed infra at note 81. Decided in 1945 and 1951, these were pre-statutory
abolition cases. The statute specifically applies to wills. It should bury the testamentary branch of the doctrine of worthier title, ending any doubt about its continued
viability.
17. 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
18. Doctor v. Hughes, 174 A.D. 767, 161 N.Y.S. 634 (1916), aff'd, 225 N.Y. 305,
122 N.E. 221 (1919).
19. A. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 108.
20. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 156. Professor Gulliver states:
Under this theory, there is a rebuttable presumption that language purporting
to transfer the property to the heirs of the transferor shows no intent to give
them an interest; the result depends on assumed intent, and not, as at common
law, on "an absolute prohibition limiting the power of a grantor."
A. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 108.
The New York rule of Doctor v. Hughes has been abolished by statute. Now a
conveyance to one's own heirs creates a remainder interest. However, the statutory
scheme does allow a settlor to revoke a trust in which there is an end limitation to his
or her own heirs without the consent of the apparent heirs. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 30.2, at 469 (1988).
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abolition discussing the effect of a limitation by a grantor (as opposed to a testator) to his heirs after an intermediate estate was involved. 2 In none of the opinions was there reference to the phrase
"doctrine of worthier title" as such. 22 An examination of these decisions is in order to determine whether the doctrine, albeit without
the label, was applied by Illinois courts as a rule of law or a rule of
construction before the statute was passed. That determination will
then aid in understanding exactly what the Illinois General Assem-

bly intended to abolish in

1955.21

The first such case was Hobbie v. Ogden,24 decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1899. In that case, the grantor (settlor) A,
as ordered in a divorce decree, placed certain real property in trust
for the support of his divorced wife B and two children for the life
of B. The corpus was to be sold and the trustee was to pay support
biannually out of the proceeds. Upon B's death, the trustee was directed to "convey, pay over and deliver to [A], or his heirs, the said
trust fund."2 A predeceased B, but his executor sought to include
the property in A's estate at B's death. The court determined that
the trustee had legal title and that full equitable title to the reversion remained in the grantor A, subject only to B's equitable life
estate.26 Assuming that Hobbie v. Ogden was applying the doctrine
of worthier title without so labeling it, then the case is significant for
two reasons. First, the court expanded the common-law doctrine of
worthier title to include personal property. 27 This application to personal property of itself shows that the doctrine was being utilized as
a rule of construction.2" Second, the rule was applied to equitable
interests.2 9 And finally, the court's emphasis on the grantor's pur21. The number of cases involving a worthier title question appears to be few.
See H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123 (noting only seven decisions up
to 1941).
22. However, one of the cases to be examined did use the phrase "worthier or
better title" in reference to the testamentary branch of the doctrine. Akers v. Clark,
184 Ill. 136, 137, 56 N.E. 296, 297 (1900). The first Illinois case found to use the
phrase "worthier and better title" was Kellett v. Shepard, 139 Ill. 433, 447, 28 N.E.
751, 755 (1891), in which the court referred to the testamentary branch. The court
viewed it as a rule of construction and found its application unnecessary.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 107-13 for a discussion of what the legislature intended to abolish.
24. 178 Il1. 357, 53 N.E. 104 (1899).
25. Id. at 362, 53 N.E. at 105.
26. Id. at 368, 53 N.E. at 107 ("The equitable title remaining in the grantor
would descend by law to his heirs, and the conveyance provided for would only be
necessary to make that a legal estate in him or them which was already vested in
them as an equitable one.").
27. Id. at 365, 53 N.E. at 106 ("The real estate conveyed by the trust deed was
to be converted into personal property ....").See also H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER,
supra note 12, at § 123; Comment, Heirs of a Settlor, supra note 11, at 847.
28. See supra note 6. See also C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 155.
29. Hobbie v. Ogden, 178 Ill.
at 367-68, 53 N.E. at 106. See also H. CAREY & D.
SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123; Comment, supra note 11, at 847.
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pose or intent is further reason for concluding that the court was
utilizing a rule of construction. It emphasized that A was required
by court decree to carve out an estate for the life of his divorced
wife and that A's purpose was to do just that. The divorce court had
no jurisdiction to provide for the distribution of his property for
other purposes or to compel him to provide for his heirs, and the
purpose of the trust was not to dispose of the fee.
The second Illinois decision, Lawrence v. Lawrence,3" is somewhat curious in that the only holding was that the supreme court
could not decide the case. Husband and wife, A and B, conveyed
property in trust to T to pay the income to B for life and then to A
for life, if he should survive B, but if he should not survive B, then
T was directed "to re-convey said premises ... to the legal heirs" of
A."1 Many years later, A and B sued to have the trust terminated
and the corpus returned to the settlors. The circuit court held that
the trust deed had not been delivered and entered a decree that the
property be returned to A and B. The Supreme Court of Illinois
reversed and remanded the case on the grounds that the circuit
court's proceedings had not been properly preserved for appeal,3"
and therefore an appellate decision could not properly be made.33
The supreme court did comment on the property interests that
were created. "The trust was a voluntary settlement for the benefit
of the settlors during their natural lives, with remainder in fee to
and for the benefit of their heirs. It was perfectly created .. .
Indeed, if a reversion were retained, then A and B were the only
persons beneficially interested in the property and the court need
not have remanded the case regardless of the improper record. Later
cases have given Lawrence meaning by adopting this reasoning.35 If
this analysis is accepted, then the doctrine of worthier title, if con30. 181 11. 248, 54 N.E. 918 (1899).
31. Id. at 250, 54 N.E. at 919.
32. Id. at 253-54, 54 N.E. at 919-20. See also H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra
note 12, at § 123; Comment supra note 11, at 847 (summarizing the opinion): The
complaint did not allege nondelivery; no certificate of evidence was preserved for appeal; and the circuit court made no specific findings of fact on the issue of
nondelivery.
33. The court stated in this regard: "When a decree in chancery granting affirmative relief is brought into review on error or appeal, the rule is [that] the decree
must be supported by testimony preserved in the record, or by facts appearing from
specific findings of fact recited in the decree." 181 Ill.
at 253, 54 N.E. at 920.
34. Id. at 252, 54 N.E. at 919 (emphasis added).
35. See H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123; Comment, supra note
11, at 848 (Heirs of a Settlor, citing, Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 Ill. 76, 159 N.E.
229 (1927); Burton v. Boren, 308 11. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923); May v. Marx, 300 Ill.
App. 144, 20 N.E.2d 821 (1939)).
The argument has also been advanced that A, by specifically reserving a life estate after the death of B, negated any intent to retain a reversion. Comment, supra
note 11, at 848.
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sidered at all, was deemed not to apply at all to the case, and certainly not as a rule of law."
37
In the next case relevant to our consideration, Akers v.Clark,
the doctrine was applied. One could argue either way on the question of whether it was applied as a rule of law or of construction. In
Akers, A made the following conveyance by deed: "[A] conveys and
warrants to [B] during her natural life and at her death to revert
back to my heirs."38 Later, A devised the fee in the same premises to
his daughter subject to B's life estate. Upon A's death, some of A's
other heirs brought suit against the daughter to partition the property. The theory for recovery was that the deed created remainder
interests in the heirs of A that could not be defeated later by devise.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that A retained a reversion and his
devise was therefore valid. The authority relied upon, in addition to
Hobbie v. Ogden, was Washburn's work on Real Property. The sections quoted set forth the rule in Shelley's case, the testamentary
branch of the doctrine of worthier title, and the following, which
amounts to the inter vivos branch of the doctrine of worthier title:

At common law, if a man seized of an estate limited it to one for life,
remainder to his own right heirs, they would take not as remaindermen but as reversioners; and it would be, moreover, competent for
him, as being himself the reversioner, after making such a limitation,
to grant away the reversion.3 9
Whether the Akers court was applying the doctrine as a rule of
construction or of law is debatable. On behalf of the former, one
could say that the grantor probably did not intend by the conveyance to give a remainder to his heirs. Even the language, "to revert
back to my heirs '"4 establishes such a contrary intent. Certainly, to
the extent that his later specific devise of the fee in the same land,
subject to B's life estate, is relevant to indicate his intent at the time
of the inter vivos conveyance, the intent to retain a reversion is
shown. On the other hand, the strongest support for an argument
that the doctrine was being applied as a rule of law was the court's
36. Caveat: there is no indication that the doctrine of worthier title was
briefed or argued by counsel, and it has been urged that the opinion should not be
considered persuasive on that point. Carey and Schuyler caution that the decision in
Lawrence should not be accorded the weight of an express ruling since the opinion "is
absolutely silent upon the point of property interests created by the deed of trust."
H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123. However, as established by the
quote in the text, the court did comment that a remainder was created in the grantors' heirs.
37. 184 Il1. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900).
38. Id. at 136, 56 N.E. at 296.
39. Id. at 138, 56 N.E. at 297 (quoting 2 E. WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
395 (2d ed. 1864)).
40. Id. at 136, 56 N.E. at 296 (emphasis added).
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comment that "under the law as well as under the deed[,]"" the
interest after B's life estate reverted to the grantor or his heirs. The
court also said that the result, a reversion in the grantor, was the
same as if the words "and at her death to revert back to my heirs"
had been omitted from the deed.42 Perhaps the court was saying
that it would reach the same conclusion whether the doctrine were a
rule of law or of construction.
Twenty years after Akers, the court relied upon the doctrine in
a totally inapplicable situation. In Biwer v. Martin,"' A, after reserving a life estate for himself, created two successive life estates, a
contingent remainder in fee, and a special power of appointment. A
then specified that if the contingent remainder failed, and if the
power of appointment were not exercised, then the remainder after
the life estates "shall vest in all the lineal descendants of grantor,
per stirpes, in fee.'"

The court held that A had a reversion in fee

simple, which was of course true, because A had created a life estates with contingent remainders in fee. The court's reasons for its
conclusion, however, are "plainly incorrect."4 5 The court stated that
the grantor's reversion resulted from the limitation to his lineal descendants. The intermingling of elements of the Rule in Shelley's
Case and the doctrine of worthier title is shown by the following
quote:
Under the rule at common law, where a grantor in a deed conveys
a life estate with remainder over, either mediately or immediately
[Shelley], to his heirs [worthier title] or the heirs of his body [heirs of
the body of the first grantee - Shelley], the heirs do not take a remainder at all but the word "heirs" is regarded as defining or limiting
the estate which the first taker has [!]. In such case the lineal heirs or
heirs of the body of the grantor take not a remainder but a reversion,
41. Id. at 139, 56 N.E. at 297.
42. Id. at 138, 56 N.E. at 297.
43. 294 Ill. 488, 128 N.E. 518 (1920). It should be noted that the limitation was
not to the grantor's heirs, and therefore the doctrine of worthier title should not have
been applied. The supreme court did apply the rule, however, and for that reason it is
included in our survey. For a further explanation, see supra text accompanying note
21.
44. 294 Ill. at 490, 128 N.E. at 520 (emphasis omitted).
45. H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123. In taking issue with the
court's analysis the authors state: "It is true that A had a reversion in fee because he
had created life estates with contingent remainders over. The limitation to his 'lineal
descendants' created a contingent remainder and the quoted words designated purchasers and did not confirm a reversion in A." Id. We agree with this analysis, because by limiting the alternate contingent remainder to A's "lineal descendants," A
excludes some who might be his heirs at law. In that case, the doctrine of worthier
title does not apply. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 8, at § 1606 ("Unless the limitation is construed to designate those persons who would take on intestacy of the grantor, then the limitation is entirely outside the scope of the rule here considered.").
The court in Akers v. Clark appeared to accept the doctrine as it existed under the
common law and thus this rule would seem to be included. For a discussion of Akers
v. Clark, see supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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and such reversion by descent from the grantor and not by the deed
[worthier titlel."6
The Illinois Supreme Court applied the doctrine as a rule of law
in Burton v. Boren,"' although once again the phrase "doctrine of
worthier title" is not used. In that case, A conveyed his interest in a
parcel of land to be held in trust by T for the benefit of A for life. At
A's death, the fee or the proceeds from its sale were to "immediately
vest in and become the property of the heirs-at-law of the said [A] .
. and said heirs-at-law shall be entitled to said property under the
'
laws of descent of the State of Illinois then in force." 48
T acted as
trustee for nine years and upon her request to be removed and have
a successor appointed, A cross-claimed for a termination of the
trust. A's theory was that the reversion was in him, and that no person other than himself and the trustee had any interest in the trust
property. A argued that as settlor he was therefore entitled to terminate the trust. The supreme court agreed that the trust deed did not
create remainders in the heirs, 49 and affirmed the termination.
Four years later the supreme court refused to allow termination
of a trust because the trust deed did create remainders. In Hubbard
v. Buddemeier,0 the settlor conveyed the fee to a trustee upon certain trusts at the termination of which the trustee was directed to
convey to the grantor's surviving issue, or if none to her "legal
heirs." The court held that the trust deed "conveyed all existing legal or equitable rights of the grantor in the premises, '"' and conferred "rights upon beneficiaries who might, in the contingencies
contemplated, succeed to [the settlor's] rights. '52 In short, the supreme court in this instance, as in the Lawrence case that it cited,53
in no way implied that the doctrine of worthier title applied at all,
much less as a rule of law.
The Illinois Appellate Court, by contrast, applied the doctrine
as a rule of construction in May v. Marx.54 The conveyance in May
was from A, who had just reached her majority, to her brothers in
46.

Biwer v. Martin, 294 I1 488, 493, 128 N.E. 518, 521 (1920). As authority for

this passage the court cited sections of 2 WASHBURN

ON REAL PROPERTY

(2d ed. 1864)

dealing with the Rule in Shelley's Case (1 242), and the doctrine of worthier title (
395), as well as Akers v. Clark, 184 11. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900).
47. 308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923).
48. Id. at 441, 139 N.E. at 868.
49. A's children and heirs apparent, disclaimed any interest in the property.
The court, however, said that the heirs had no interest to disclaim and never would
have except as reversioners by descent from A. Id. at 443, 139 N.E. at 869.
50. 328 I1. 76, 159 N.E. 229 (1927).
51. Id. at 80-81, 159 N.E. at 232.
52. Id. at 84, 159 N.E. at 233.
53. Id. at 82, 159 N.E. at 233 (citing Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E.
918 (1899)).
54. 300 Ill. App. 144, 20 N.E.2d 821 (1939).
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trust for her benefit for twenty-five years. The trustees were to pay
A $3,000 quarterly from income. If A did not live for twenty-five
years, then "[u]pon my death the trust shall be dissolved and the
property shall descend to my heirs, as the law provides. ' 5 5 A few
days later A purported to modify the trust to provide that all the
income could be paid to her, in the discretion of the trustee. Years
later the trustees brought suit against A and her presumptive heirs
for a construction of the trust instrument. A contended that the
purpose of the trust was to relieve herself of the management of the
property and not to give anyone other than herself any interest. The
court agreed, and held that she had a reversion in the twenty-five
year term and thus the right to modify the trust.
The court spent considerable effort reviewing whether the trust5
ees had a fee simple estate in the trust property under Illinois law
but then made the significant conclusion that: "The determination
in each case depends on the intent of the settlor as disclosed in the
language used in the instrument." 7 The opinion does not advance
any other evidence to support its conclusion beyond the words of
the conveyance itself. The effect of the court's holding is that where
there is no contradictory evidence on the issue of intent then the
grantor is assumed to have retained a reversion. Thus, the May
court had adopted the New York view stated in Doctor v. Hughes5 s
apparently without realizing what it had done. 5 The Illinois Su55. Id. at 146, 20 N.E.2d at 822.
56. Whether it matters for doctrine of worthier title purposes that the trustee
has a fee in the corpus has generated much confusion in the Illinois decisions. One
author commented:
It is interesting to note that the court [in May v. Marx] held that, although the trustee had the power of sale, he did not have the legal fee. The law
to the contrary is well settled in Illinois. Apparently the court feared that so to
[sic] hold would result in a remainder rather than a reversion because Burton
v. Boren had been the last case decided and that case apparently felt [sic] that
the legal fee in the trustee was sufficient to make the words ones of purchase.
Perhaps that too was why the court attempted to distinguish Lawrence v. Lawrence. But, as has been seen, the court in the Burton case was apparently
wrong for it would appear under the earlier Illinois cases to make no difference
whether or not the legal fee was in the trustee.
Comment, Heirs of a Settlor, supra note 11, at 849-50.
57. 300 Ill. App. at 155, 20 N.E.2d at 825.
58. The court in May used the doctrine to presume intent where no other evidence was available. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the presumption of intent. The evidence required to rebut the presumption that the
grantor intended a reversion was of a "clearly expressed" contrary intent. Doctor v.
Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 312, 122 N.E. 221, 222 (1919). This standard was relaxed later
to require the court only to ascertain that the grantor's intent was to give a remainder
instead of retaining a reversion. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298,
301, 165 N.E. 454, 455 (1929).
59. The court did not cite to Doctor v. Hughes, nor did it recognize in the opinion that it was altering the law. However, the commentators and the Illinois Bar understood the impact of the May decision. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 8, at §
1609 (stating that Illinois cases go both ways on how Illinois applies the doctrine and

19891

Worthier Title in Illinois

preme Court appeared to affirm May in Sutliff v. Aydelott,60 decided the following year.
Sutliff was a trust termination action. Several settlors, apparently from one family, conveyed real property and capital stock in
trust. The real property was conveyed to the trustees reserving to
the grantors the "rents, issues and profits thereof" until a sale was
effected by the trustees. At another place in the trust instrument
the income from the trust was to be applied to the benefit of the
grantors "and the heirs of each of them"" while the real estate shall
remain in the trust. The trustees were empowered to sell the real
estate from time to time and divide the proceeds "among said beneficiaries [the grantors] ...and their heirs." 's The personal property
was conveyed to the trustees for the life of the grantors and after
the survivor's death to be conveyed "to the heirs-at-law" of the
grantors. The Illinois Supreme Court treated the two conveyances
separately.
The court first analyzed the conveyance of the real estate. However, in that regard the court erroneously referred to the applicable
rule as the Rule in Shelley's Case,6" and stated that the word "heirs"
was a word of limitation and not of purchase. The court then cited
Burton v. Boren s4 as also setting down the rule that the word
"heirs" is "a word of limitation.""5 Carey and Schuyler succinctly
comment on this misconception where the doctrine of worthier title
citing the May decision as an application of the doctrine as a rule of construction).
Kelly, Real Property Developments, 43 ILL. B.J. 59, 60 n.8 (1955) (citing the May
decision as treating the doctrine as a rule of construction and not of property).
60. 373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529 (1940).
61. Id. at 635, 27 N.E.2d at 531 (emphasis added).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 636-37, 27 N.E.2d at 531. One commentator has succinctly illustrated
the Rule in Shelley's Case as follows:
Thus, A conveys or devises land to B for life, and after B's death to the heirs of
B. Apart from the Rule in Shelley's Case the state of the title would be: life
estate in B, contingent remainder in fee simple in B's heirs, reversion in A in
fee. But by virtue of the Rule the state of the title is: life estate in B, vested
remainder in B in fee simple. The doctrine of merger will then cause B's life
estate to coalesce with his remainder so that the ultimate result is that B gets a
present estate in fee simple.
C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 139. Since the conveyance of real property in Sutliff
referred only to the grantors and their heirs, the Rule in Shelley's Case is not applicable. For the latter rule to apply there must be a grant of a freehold followed by a
remainder to the grantee's heirs. Also notice that the Rule in Shelley's Case operates
as a rule of law. Id. at 138-39; Sutliff, 373 Ill. at 638, 27 N.E.2d at 532. Because the
court in Sutliff relied upon it, however erroneously, one might argue that the court
actually applied the doctrine of worthier title to the real property conveyance as a
rule of law.
64. 308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923). For a discussion of Burton, see supra notes
47-49 and accompanying text. The court also cited Biwer v. Martin, 294 Il1. 488, 128
N.E. 518 (1920), and Akers v. Clark, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900). For a discussion
of Biwer and Akers, see supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
65. Sutliff, 373 Ill. at 637, 27 N.E.2d at 532.
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is involved:
This is incorrect. The question has never been whether the word
"heirs", or any other, is a word of purchase or one of limitation. The
question is whether such a word or words are words of purchase
[granting a remainder] or wholly meaningless and superfluous. A
grantor never acquires a reversion through the use of such words. He
has it without them if he has it at all.$$
Nonetheless, under this analysis the settlors were allowed to terminate the trust and regain legal title to the real estate. The result was
indeed correct. If a grantor A settles a trust for the benefit of "A
and her heirs," A has the full equitable interest. The words "and her
heirs" are in this situation words of limitation; no remainder in anyone was purportedly granted.
However, in the trust of the personal property a remainder following the grantors' beneficial life estates was limited to their heirs.
The court gave effect to the limitation as a remainder. The court
first reasoned that the Rule in Shelley's Case was not applicable to
personal property and therefore the court need not mechanically apply a rule of law. The court then found that the grantors had conveyed all of their interest to the trustees6 7 and that they had reserved only the income and dividends from the trust. And by
directing a conveyance of the corpus to the heirs of the grantors
upon the death of the survivor of the grantors, the grantors had not
intended to retain a reversion.
The two portions of the opinion were then tied together by the
statement: "[t]he intention being clear, and there being no rule of
construction to apply as in the case of real estate, there was no
power in the court to terminate the trust with respect to the per66. H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123.
67. 373 Ill. at 638, 27 N.E.2d at 532: "The language of the trust indenture with
respect to personal property ... provides that the stock shall be held until after the
death of all the grantors, and after the death of the survivor the trustees shall convey
to the heirs-at-law the several undivided interests in the stock." This reference to the
trustees having the entire legal fee demonstrated the confusion discussed previously.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of this confusion. Where
the trust is executory in character the doctrine of worthier title was said not to apply.
Sutliff, 373 Ill. at 637-38, 27 N.E.2d at 532. The court recites:
The test as to whether a trust is executory is to determine whether the testator
or settlor has acted as his own conveyancer and defines precisely the settlement to be made. If he has, the word "heirs" is one of limitation. If he has not,
the trust is executory, and the word "heirs" is a word of purchase, and the
persons coming within such definition have an interest in the property. One of
the tests to determine whether the settlor has acted as his own conveyancer is
to ascertain whether the trust instrument purports to pass title directly to the
beneficiaries or whether the instrument requires a trustee to make the conveyance. If the trust instrument requires the trustee to convey, it is presumed the
trust is executory ....

Id. (citations omitted).
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sonal property."' Thus, the supreme court seems to have held that
a remainder was created in the grantors' heirs where the court had
no evidence of contrary intent.6 9 If this was the court's new interprethen it appeared to reverse itself again in
tation of the doctrine,
70
Corwin v. Rheims.
In Corwin, under the court's construction of a prior conveyance
and a trust," three siblings owned a reversion in land in Chicago,
subject to a ninety-nine year lease. The siblings conveyed their interests to a trustee, reserving beneficial life estates in themselves,
insofar as relevant. The instrument provided: "[I]n the event of the
death of all of said beneficiaries the trust hereby created shall cease
and terminate, and said property shall be and become the property
of the legal heirs of the [settlors] in equal shares per stirpes and not
per capita. 7' 2 The last surviving settlor, Maude, was the heir of the
other two settlors. Maude died, leaving A as her sole heir. Maude
died testate, however, devising one-fourth of the corpus to A and the
other three-fourths to four others. A argued that she took the entire
interest as a remainderman, since she was the settlors' heir. The
four other devisees argued that the doctrine of worthier title applied, so that Maude died owning a reversion, which she properly
devised.
The court held that the doctrine applied and, therefore, the
property passed by the devise. The court did not consider whether
the intent of the settlors of the trust was to create a remainder or
merely to confirm a reversion. Instead, the Corwin court applied the
doctrine as a positive rule of law. It said: "This case ... involves the
rule of the common law that one who owns real estate cannot, either
7
by conveyance or by limitation of uses, make his heirs purchasers.'
Moreover, the court's response to A's argument that "heirs" of the
settlors should be fixed upon the death of the survivor and meant
68. Id. at 638-39, 27 N.E.2d at 532.
We have no explanation of what the court meant by a "rule of construction...
as in the case of real estate" (emphasis added), when it had just applied a rule of law
to the real estate. Id. One might argue that the court was rejecting the doctrine of
worthier title as a rule of construction in personal property conveyances.
69. Carey and Schuyler argue that the intention of the grantors was clear in
Sutliff, and that the heirs should have received the real property as well. This construction of the real property trust would require that "and their heirs" be read as
"or their heirs." H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123.
70. 390 Ill. 205, 61 N.E.2d 40 (1945).
71. We discuss the court's construction of the prior conveyance and trust rather
than our own construction of the instruments, because in our opinion the court arrived at its construction by an erroneous application of the rule against perpetuities.
That topic is outside the scope of this discussion, and the error to which we refer is
at 229, 61 N.E.2d at 51
adequately considered by the dissent in Corwin, 390 Ill.
(Gunn, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 210-11, 61 N.E.2d at 43-44 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id. at 224, 61 N.E.2d at 49.
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the common heirs of all three settlors on that date was as follows:
Under the views expressed, this [argument] is immaterial, for the persons who could qualify as legal heirs, determined either at the death
of each settlor or at the death of the survivor, are the heirs of the ones

who conveyed the property and the principle that17 a4 grantor cannot
make his heir a purchaserapplies in either case."

It is well established that if the grantor uses the designation
"heirs" to mean a class other than those who would take on intestacy according to the statutes of descent and distribution, the doctrine of worthier title does not apply, certainly not as a rule of construction.7

5

For example, if the "heirs" are to be determined as of a

76
time other than the grantor's death, the rule does not apply. So if
heirs were interpreted to mean the common heirs determined at the
death of the surviving grantor, as they were pretty clearly intended
to be in Corwin, it would indicate an intention to designate a class
of persons as purchasers and not merely those who should take
under intestate succession at the death of each settlor.7 7 The holding
of the court, in ignoring such considerations, strongly supports the

conclusion that the rule was applied as a positive rule of law.7 8 Inter-

estingly enough, the court for the first time cites Doctor v. Hughes,
the leading rule of construction case. 9
Thus, the status of the inter vivos branch of the doctrine of
worthier title in Illinois was uncertain when the Illinois General Assembly passed the statute abolishing the doctrine in 1955.80 The feudal doctrine began as a positive rule of property law, but by 1955 it
was also regularly being applied as a rule of construction, or just
ignored."' Of the nine cases examined, the doctrine was applied as a
74. Id. at 225, 61 N.E.2d at 49-50 (emphasis added).
75. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 8, at §§ 1606, 1609-10.
76. Id. at § 1610 n.93.
77. Id. at § 1609. For example, a spouse of one of the settlors could have been
an heir of that settlor at the time of her death, but if the spouse died before the
surviving settlor, the spouse would not have been her heir as determined at the death
of the surviving settlor.
78. Kelly, supra note 59, at 60 n.8; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 8, at § 1609.
79. Corwin, 390 Ill. at 224, 61 N.E.2d at 49. See supra text accompanying notes
17-20 for a discussion of Doctor v. Hughes. In addition, the Corwin court cited to
Burton v. Boren, 308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923); Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128
N.E. 518 (1920); and Akers v. Clark, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900). See Corwin, 390
Ill. at 224, 61 N.E.2d at 49.
80. 1955 Ill, Laws 498.
81. Uncertainty is no doubt fueled when the dicta in McNeilly v. Wylie, 389 Ill.
391, 59 N.E.2d 811 (1945), and Boldenweck v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 343 Ill.
App. 569, 99 N.E.2d 692 (1951) are considered. The Illinois Supreme Court in both
cases held that the testamentary branch of the doctrine of worthier title was not applicable to the facts.
The same justice wrote the McNeilly opinion and the Corwin opinion a short
time later. He quoted the common-law rule in reference to the inter vivos branch,
noted its abolition by statute in England in 1833, and then stated that it was applied
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rule of construction in three,82 as a rule of law in two," arguably as
either in one, 8 ' not at all in two,"5 and impossibly intertwined with
the Rule in Shelley's Case and misapplied to "lineal descendants" in
86
one.
C.

Treatment of the Doctrine of Worthier Title in Illinois
After Its Abolition by Statute

It was with this background that the Illinois General Assembly
abolished the doctrine of worthier title by statute in 1955. Sections
188 and 189 provide:
Where a deed, will or other instrument purports to create any present
or future interest in real or personal property in the heirs of the
maker of the instrument, the heirs shall take, by purchase and not by
descent, the interest that the instrument purports to create. The doctrine of worthier title and the rule of the common law that a grantor
cannot create a limitation in favor of his own heirs are abolished.
This Act shall apply only to instruments
which become effective after
87
the effective date of this Act.
The only opinion construing this act was rendered by the Appellate Court of Illinois in Stewart v. Merchants National Bank.88
In that case Stewart, after receiving a personal injury settlement in
1967, created a trust with himself as beneficiary. The instrument recited that the trust was irrevocable, to last for ten years, and that if
the settlor/beneficiary should die within the ten years, then in default of a will the property should pass to his heirs-at-law in equal
shares. Three years later Stewart petitioned to revoke the trust. No
consent was possible from the settlor's heirs, which might include
unborn or minor heirs, so the issue was whether the settlor was the
in the United States "more as a rule of construction." McNeilly, 389 Ill. at 393, 59
N.E.2d at 812. He stated the testamentary branch of the doctrine and said it is "[t]he
rule in this State." Id. The court held, however, that the testamentary branch did not
apply to the facts in McNeilly. Id.
In Boldenweck, the Illinois Appellate Court said that "[t]here is no positive rule
of law or rule of property in this State that a person cannot by his will limit his
remainder to his own heirs." Boldenweck, 343 Ill. App. at 590, 99 N.E.2d at 701.
82. Hobbie v. Ogden, 178 Ill. 357, 53 N.E. 104 (1897); May v. Marx, 300 Ill. App.
144, 20 N.E.2d 821 (1939); Sutliff v. Aydelott, 373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529 (1940).
83. Burton v. Boren, 308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923); Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill.
205, 61 N.E.2d 40 (1945).
84. Akers v. Clark, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900).
85. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E. 918 (1899); Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 Ill. 76, 159 N.E. 229 (1927).
86. Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128 N.E. 518 (1920). The intertwining with the
Rule in Shelley's Case also occurred in Sutliff v. Aydelott, 373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529
(1940).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30,
188-189 (1987).
88. 3 Ill. App. 3d 337, 278 N.E.2d 10 (1972). For a discussion of Stewart, see
Note, The Doctrine of Worthier Title as a Rule of Construction in Illinois, 67 Nw.
U.L. REV. 773 (1972) (analyzing the case and concluding that it is poor precedent).
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sole beneficiary. The trial court held that contingent interests were
created in Stewart's heirs and denied revocation. The appellate
court held that the heirs did not have a remainder interest and allowed revocation.
The court referred to the statute abolishing the doctrine of worthier title, but found that May v. Marx"9 was still good law. The
court reasoned that since the General Assembly would not change
the rule that the intent of the settlor should govern, and since under
May the doctrine of worthier title only presumes intent, then the
doctrine is still valid as a rule of construction in spite of the statute.
The court therefore read the statute as only abrogating the doctrine
where applied as a rule of law.
In referring to the statute, the appellate court quoted only the
first sentence. It then said: "Imperative as that language may seem,
we refuse to believe that it would require a trust to be construed in
such a way as to override the expressed intent of the maker of such
instrument."9 Over and above the disregard for the plain, "imperative" language of the statute, the statement is subject to criticism in
referring to the settlor's "expressed" intent not to make his heirs
beneficiaries, when he had expressly provided for just that." The
only intent expressed in the trust was threefold: First, that if Stewart died within the ten years, the remainder was to go to Stewart's
"heirs-at-law in equal shares if beneficiary [Stewart] leaves no valid
will." Second, that the trust be spendthrift in nature.2 And third,
that the trust be irrevocable within the ten-year term. To glean from
these expressions of intent that Stewart "expressly" intended to retain a reversion in the term strains credulity.
The reliance on case law by the Stewart court was misplaced,
even if the doctrine of worthier title did survive as a rule of construction. The end limitation in May v. Marx was that upon settlor's
death, the property "descent [sic] to my heirs, as the law pro89. May v. Marx, 300 Ill. App. 144, 20 N.E.2d 831 (1939).
90. Stewart, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 340, 278 N.E.2d at 13.
91. The Reporter's Notes to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 30.2, at 46667 (1988), points out the Stewart court's failure to indicate clearly which words
showed the "expressed intent" on the part of the settlor to creat a reversion. The
Reporter says that it is clear from the opinion that the provisions quoted in the text
were ignored.

92. Because Stewart was the in fact the settlor (although the instrument purported to make his attorney the settlor), the spendthrift clause would have been unenforceable. A property owner may not create a spendthrift trust in his own favor. G.
BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 110 (4th ed. 1963). That point was not
relevant in the case. The spendthrift clause, as well as the provision for irrevocability,

does demonstrate Stewart's lack of confidence in his own prudence. The court noted
that the primary purposes of the trust were to provide for Stewart's rehabilitation
from personal injuries and to pay a mortgage debt on his home.
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vides."93 The end limitation in Stewart was to Stewart's "heirs-atlaw in equal shares." 4 Stewart's heirs under the statute of descent
and distribution might not have taken in equal shares, but per stirpes." Perhaps a more important difference between May and Stewart is that in the former there was no reservation of a testamentary
power of appointment in the settlor whereas in the Stewart trust
there was. In the New York case of Richardson v. Richardson,"
cited with approval by the Stewart court, the court held that a remainder was created by a limitation to intestate successors in default of appointment by will. The Richardson court therefore denied
termination. Moreover, New York had by statute abolished its worthier title doctrine after the Richardson case, but six years before
the Stewart case, a factor the court did not consider. '
The ultimate fate of Stewart as precedent, and indeed the fate
of the statute abolishing the doctrine of worthier title, is quite uncertain. Twice since its statutory abolition the supreme court has
spoken obliquely about the doctrine, but in neither case did the
court construe Section 188. In addition, both cases involved instruments which had become effective before the effective date of the
statute.
The dispute in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v.Beach" required the court to interpret two instruments creating inter vivos
trusts in the 1920's. In each, A settled the trust for the benefit of his
wife B for life. In the 1921 trust he provided that if B survived A,
then upon B's death the corpus be divided among the heirs of A,
share and share alike. The 1926 trust provided that upon B's death
the trust would terminate and the corpus be distributed equally
among A's heirs. At the death of B the trustees sought instructions
regarding the distribution of the estate. The trial court held that the
doctrine of worthier title applied to these instruments only as a rule
of construction. Taking A at his word, the trial court held that A
intended to make a gift to his heirs, and not to retain a reversion for
himself, upon the stated conditions. Finally, the trial court held that
the identity of the remaindermen, A's heirs, was determined at the
time of A's death. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
93. Stewart, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 340, 278 N.E.2d at 13 (quoting May v. Marx, 300
Ill. app. 144, 20 N.E.2d 831 (1939)).
94. Id. at 339, 278 N.E.2d at 12.
95. The doctrine applies only where there is a limitation to the grantor's heirs
in the technical sense. Because persons who take by intestacy do not necessarily take
equal shares, it is probable that Stewart did not use the word heirs in the technical
sense. Note, supra note 88, at 783-84.
96. 298 N.Y. 35, 81 N.E.2d 54 (1948).
97. N.Y. EST. POwERS & TRUST LAW § 6-5.9 (McKinney 1967) (enacted 1966).
The Revisers' Notes to this section state that § 6-5.9 abolishes the doctrine of worthier title and changes the case law of Doctor v. Hughes and its progeny.
98. 118 Ill. 2d 1, 513 N.E.2d 833 (1987).
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doctrine of worthier title in Illinois in the 1920's applied as a rule of
9

law.

The supreme court reversed, disagreeing with both courts below. It decided that the identity of A's heirs should be determined
at the time of B's death. That decision, of course, rendered the doctrine of worthier title inapplicable, for the doctrine is in issue only
when there is a purported gift to legal heirs, determined at the time

of A's death.100 In the court's words:
As a result, the doctrine [of worthier title] is not relevant and therefore we need not reach the other issues briefed before this court:
whether the doctrine is a rule of construction or rule of law and
whether the doctrine is an anachronism which should be abandoned
in the case of trusts established in Illinois prior to our 1955 statutory
abolition of the doctrine.' 01
In Warren Boynton State Bank v. Wallbaum,0 2 the deed in

controversy was executed in 1903. The grantor, after reserving a life
estate in himself, conveyed a tract to his then five-year old daughter
for life, and upon her death "leaving no . . .children her surviving
the [real estate] shall descend to the heirs of [the grantor] share and
share alike. The children of any deceased child taking only the share
which their parent would inherit if living."' 3 The interpretation depended on what was meant by the phrase heirs of the grantor. The
trial court decided that all the grantor's heirs (including the life ten-

ant daughter), determined upon the death of the grantor, took from
the deed. The appellate court decided that heirs was used in its nontechnical sense to mean the grantor's children." Accordingly, it said
that the doctrine of worthier title did not apply:
It is not a positive rule of law but only a rule of construction and
99. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Beach, 145 Ill. App. 3d 673, 495 N.E.2d 1170
(1986). In support of its decision the appellate court cited Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill.
205, 61 N.E.2d 40 (1945); Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill. 488, 128 N.E. 518 (1920); and
Akers v. Clark, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900). Beach, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 676, 495
N.E.2d at 1173. The appellate court's citation of McNeilly v. Wylie as reciting that
the Illinois rule is a rule of law and not of construction shows confusion between the
testamentary and inter vivos branches of the doctrine. Id. at 676, 495 N.E.2d at 1173.
See supra note 81 for a discussion of McNeilly v. Wylie.
100. Beach, 118 Ill. 2d at 20, 513 N.E.2d at 842. See supra text accompanying
notes 75-76 for a discussion of the effect on the doctrine's applicability depending on
when a decedent's "heirs" are determined.
101. Id. at 20, 513 N.E.2d at 843. The discussion in Beach of McNeilly and
other testamentary cases revealed some confusion. The testamentary branch requires
that a devise to heirs be of the same kind and quality that would pass by descent
were the gift to heirs omitted from the will. The inter vivos branch requires that the
purported gift to heirs be intended to indicate those who would take by inheritance.
102. 123 Ill. 2d 429, 528 N.E.2d 640 (1988).
103. Id. at 433, 528 N.E.2d at 642.
104. 143 Ill. App. 3d 628, 493 N.E.2d 21 (1986), rev'd, 123 Ill. 2d 429, 528
N.E.2d 640 (1988). For a good discussion of this case at the appellate court level, see
Whitfield, Property, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 915, 920-28 (1987).
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when it is clear from the language employed that the grantor intended
to use the term "heirs" in other than its strict, technical sense,105the
Doctrine will not be allowed to defeat the intent of the drafter.
The supreme court reversed, disagreeing with both courts below. It decided that heirs of the grantor meant "heirs" as determined as if the grantor had died at the death of the life tenant
daughter. it commented that, accordingly, the doctrine of worthier
title is not applicable, stating that: "Our court fully addressed that
'0
issue in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Beach."'
III.

THE STATUS OF THE RULE IN ILLINOIS: BURYING THE DEAD

A.

Analysis of the Statute-What Did It Abolish?

The most important question facing any court confronted with
a worthier title issue arising after 1955 is what precisely did the statute abolish. Did it abolish the doctrine as a rule of law or of construction? The authors maintain that the General Assembly intended Section 188 to abolish the doctrine of worthier title
completely from Illinois law.
The General Assembly worded the statute as inclusively as possible to incorporate the doctrine as applied in Illinois. This thesis
derives from a comparison of Section 188 to the Illinois decisions
and the common law before the statute was passed. Furthermore,
the fact of enactment of legislation and the language mandate that
courts apply different law after the statute.
A close analysis of the statute demonstrates its inclusiveness.
For example, Section 188 begins by including all modern means of
conveyancing within its scope. Its applicability to deeds, wills, and
1 °7
other instruments encompasses every decision on point in Illinois.
In fact, the term "other instruments" appears particularly directed
at trust instruments because of their frequent treatment in the Illinois decisions. 0 s
105. 143 Ill. App. 3d at 632, 493 N.E.2d at 24-25.
106. 123 Ill. 2d at 442, 528 N.E.2d at 646.
107. The applicable conveyances of two decisions were by deed, of legal interests: Akers v. Clark, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900); Biwer v. Martin, 294 Ill.
488, 128
N.E. 518 (1920). The applicable conveyances in the remaining seven cases were by
trust instruments: Corwin v. Rheims, 390 Ill. 205, 61 N.E.2d 40 (1945); Sutliff v. Aydelott, 373 Ill. 633, 27 N.E.2d 529 (1940); May v. Marx, 300 Il1. App. 144, 20 N.E.2d
821 (1939); Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 I1. 76, 159 N.E. 229 (1927); Burton v. Boren,
308 Ill. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E. 918
(1899); Hobbie v. Ogden, 178 Ill. 357, 53 N.E. 104 (1899). The two other decisions
most recently prior to the statute involved wills. See supra note 81 for a discussion of
these two will decisions.
108. Of the nine cases decided before Section 188 was enacted, the instrument
of conveyance in seven of them was the trust deed. See supra note 107 for citation to
these seven cases.
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The statute also includes all types of property to which the doctrine has been applied. The words "real or personal property" surely
include land, personalty, and the equitable interests that were at issue in decisions such as Hobbie v. Ogden.10 9 Additionally, the statute
specifies "any" present or future interests in property. This also indicates expansive coverage of the statutory requirement of abolition.
The General Assembly's use of the word purports also gives
Section 188 a broad application. The usual meaning attributed to
the word is "[t]o convey, imply, or profess outwardly, as one's (esp. a
thing's) meaning, intention, or true character; to have the appearance, often the specious appearance, of being, intending, claiming,
etc. (that which is implied or inferred)." ' Thus, Section 188 mandates that when any instrument reveals the appearance of creating
an interest in the heirs of the maker then the statutory terms must
be applied, that is, that the heirs shall take.
This language, in essence, appears to be directed at bringing
within the statute the doctrine as a rule of construction as well as of
law. Any other interpretation would rob the word purport of its rational meaning. The word if properly interpreted includes the doctrine when used as a rule of construction; because in that case the
limitation to the grantor's heirs is said to presume intent, and the
word purport means "to

. .

. imply

. . .

as one's . . . intention, or

true character."
The word includes the doctrine as a rule of law, because the
words used in the instrument "have the appearance .

.

. of in-

tending" that the heirs take a remainder. This is because the words
to my heirs give at least the appearance of an intent that the heirs
are to take. Thoughtful authorities have pointed out in this regard
that the word heirs is totally meaningless unless it is held to be a
word of purchase."' Thus, the statute should be read to include
both rules." 2
The General Assembly then supplied its own meaning to the
conveyance if it met the above, expansive criteria. The statute pro109. 178 Ill. 357, 53 N.E. 104 (1899). See supra text accompanying notes 24-29
for a discussion of Hobbie.
110.

WEBSTER'S

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE

2017 (2d ed. unabr. 1941).
111. H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12, at § 123. See also infra notes 123,
124, and 131.
112. In fact, the draftsman of Section 188 has stated that the statute was intended to abolish the doctrine as a rule of law and of construction. Note, supra note
88, at 778-79 n.26 (letter from Daniel M. Schuyler, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Section on Real Estate Law, Illinois State Bar Association, to Amos M. Pinkerton, Executive Secretary, Illinois State Bar Association, July 16, 1954, on file at
the Northwestern University Law Review Offices, 357 East Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL
60611).
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vides that in limitations to the grantor's heirs the heirs "shall" take
by purchase and not descent. This, in effect, means that the Illinois
courts should disregard the doctrine of worthier title and give effect
to a remainder to the heirs of the grantor.
Furthermore, although the doctrine was being applied in Illinois
in 1955 both as a rule of law and of construction, the General Assembly did not discriminate between the two in Section 188. That
section merely states: "The doctrine of worthier title and the rule of
the common law that a grantor cannot create a limitation in favor of
his own heirs are abolished."11' s The drafter says the same thing
twice, really three times, once in the first sentence and twice in the
second sentence. Why else but for emphasis? 14 This broad, inclusive, emphatic language where the legislature appeared well informed on the subject matter manifests that the General Assembly
intended to abolish the doctrine as a rule of law and of construction.
Thus, the answer to the question "what did Section 188 abolish" appears to be easily answerable-the entire doctrine of worthier
title as it was known in 1955. Any other conclusion is hard to justify
in light of the history of the doctrine in Illinois and the specific statutory language used by the legislature.
This interpretation of Section 188 is reinforced by noting the
language used in the statute abolishing the Rule in Shelley's case in
1953."1 The Rule in Shelley's Case is similar to the doctrine of worthier title in some respects but has always been applied as a positive
rule of law." 6 The former rule was abolished by the single sentence:
"The rule of property known as the rule in Shelley's Case is abolished."" 7 The similarity of history and application of the two rules
would seem to dictate similar treatment by the General Assembly,
and the differences between the length of the two statutes is explained by the dual and inconsistent application of the doctrine of
worthier title in the Illinois cases.
For these reasons, the doctrine of worthier title should be considered totally abolished as to instruments effective after 1955. The
most compelling reason for so holding is the doctrine of separation
113. ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 30, 188 (1987).
114. Cf. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-5.9 (McKinney 1967): "Where a
remainder is limited to the heirs or distributees of the creator of an estate in property, such heirs or distributees take as purchasers."
Interestingly enough, no litigation has been required to "construe" this statute.
At least there are no annotations under it in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 6-5.9
(McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1989). Apparently, the one sentence was plain enough.
115. 1953 Ill. Laws 1479; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, 186 (1987).
116. See supra note 63 for the text of the Rule in Shelley's Case. In fact, the
Rule in Shelley's Case arose from the same common law concerns and about the same
time as the doctrine of worthier title. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 7, at 151.
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, 186 (1987).
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of powers. Courts ought to apply statutes ingenuously, whether or
not they agree with the legislature as to the wisdom of those
statutes.
B. Benefits from Abolition
There are reasons in addition to respect for the 'legislature for
following the statute. The body of Illinois case law interpreting the
effect of a conveyance to a grantor's heirs is confusing, inconsistent,
and unnecessarily complex.11 And if Illinois retains the doctrine, its
caselaw will even more closely begin to parallel the New York experience under Doctor v. Hughes. There, many cases indistinguishable
on their facts were decided differently." 9 The question most troublesome was what constituted an expression of "contrary intent" sufficient to overcome the presumption that a grantor intended to retain a reversion. Professor Leach lamented:
Inevitably each case is a toss-up, and most go right up to the Court of
Appeals. One of my colleagues made a study of the New York cases to
see if he could find some thread of rationality running through them.
His conclusion was that if the case came before the Court in evennumbered years there was a four-to-one chance that a contrary intent
would be found, but vice versa in odd-numbered years. There's jurisprudence for you with a vengeance. 2 '
Uncertainty and unpredictability in the law breed economic
waste. In the context of donative transactions it tears families apart.
Consider, for example the Harris Bank and Warren Boynton cases:
In both cases, the courts at each of the three levels reached different
conclusions as to the intent of the grantor in limiting interests to his
21
heirs.1
118. The doctrine of worthier title has been fraught with confusion almost from
the beginning. The problems associated with executory trusts are vivid examples, for
a discussion of which see supra note 67 and accompanying text. In other opinions, the
courts have confused the doctrine of worthier title with the rule in Shelley's Case.
Throughout the doctrine's history in Illinois it has been applied inconsistently as
both a rule of construction and of law.
119. Comment, supra note 11 at 841 ("[I]t is impossible to reconcile all of the
cases or to set out a formula which will definitely point to a reversion or a
remainder.").
120. B. LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED 56 (1967).
121. Of course, abolishing the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of construction
will not obviate all problems of interpreting gifts to heirs. Problems of implied conditions of survivorship will remain. Comment, Future Interests-Remainders-Status
of Implied Conditions of Survivorship in Illinois, 13 S. ILL. U.L.J. 131 (1988).
Incidentally, a return to the law of Evans v. Giles, discussed in Casenote, Future
Interests-Contingent Remainders-Unstated Conditions of Survivorship, S. ILL.
U.L.J. 313 (1982), would greatly ameliorate those problems. In refusing to imply conditions of survivorship and in dropping the doctrine of worthier title courts would be
taking grantors at their word, rather than engaging in second guessing the likely intent of a grantor, often long dead, about contingencies he probably never thought
about. Cf. In re Estate of Breckenridge, 56 Il. App. 3d 128, 130, 371 N.E.2d 1286,
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The Illinois situation does not have to become as untenable as
was the law in New York before its abolition statute. Certainty and
predictability can be enhanced if Illinois courts will replace the doctrine of worthier title with the cardinal rule of interpretation of instruments that the writer's intent should govern the meaning attributed to it, and that "[n]o technical rule of construction should be
permitted to interfere.

' 122

This means simply treating the doctrine

as if it never existed. Courts will then look for the grantor's intent
and decide accordingly-without reference to the artificial presumption created by the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of
construction.
In many cases there is no evidence of the grantor's intent other
than the words of a short conveyance which include a remainder or
executory interest to the grantor's heirs. The grantor's limitation of
a future interest to his heirs, without more, is sufficient evidence of
the intent that they take as purchasers. 23 Presuming the contrary,
that a grantor meant to keep a reversion for himself from his words
granting an interest to others, flies in the face of common sense.' 24
The policy reason that has been advanced for retaining the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of construction is that it gives the
courts flexibility in responding to efforts to revoke trusts.'25 It has
been called "a useful weapon in the armory of the judicial legislator."''

2

Professor

Gulliver

cogently

criticizes

that

kind

of

"flexibility":
There are some who consider this sort of adroit and esoteric intellectual exercise an admirable example of the legal mind at work. On the
other hand, it may be suggested that courts should meet the issues
presented squarely, and overrule precedent if it is no longer satisfac1287 (1978) ("Rules of construction are simply artificial devices by which courts find
an intent when very probably none existed at the time the instrument became
operative.").
122. Boldenweck v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 343 Il1. App. 569, 579, 99
N.E.2d 692, 696 (1951).
123. See H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, supra note 12 at § 123; C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 7, at 161 ("As a rule of construction the inter vivos aspect of the doctrine has
been productive of litigation and confusion; and it has been questioned whether the.

.rule does in fact express the intention of the normal settlor of a trust."). Comment,

supra note 11, at 851 ("[A]ny rule of construction which passes over and ignores the
[word] heirs,'.., limiting what plainly purports to be a remainder, is not in harmony
with the interpretative process.").
124. The doctrine "gave language an effect contrary to its usual meaning (as the
[1833 Report of the English Commission] put it with British restraint, 'We also think,
that where the Testator expressly devises an estate, his intention may be inferred to

be that the devise should take effect.')" A. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 95.

125. See id., referring to worthier title as a "popular, though not necessarily
desirable, device for getting results, particularly in the face of embarrassing
precedent."
126. Note, The Rule Favoring Title by Descent Over Title by Devise, 46 HARv.
L. REV. 993, 1000 (1933).
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tory. In any event, the ad hoc use of worthier title has led to confusion
and therefore to litigation; the real issues and motivations may be entirely obscured in an opinion by technical discussion of worthier title
or evanescent speculation about "intent"; and one judge, wishing to
reach result X, may hold that worthier title applies to certain language, whereas another judge, wishing to reach result Y, may hold
that it does not. One cannot expect consistent and predictable law to
emerge from decisions framed largely or entirely in terms of an escape
device that has nothing to do with the real issue before the court.'"7
In short, retaining the doctrine in order to increase flexibility is
an improper method to protect a settlor's interest in revoking a
trust. To allow the doctrine to be used in this way confuses both the
law of revocability of trusts and the law of remainders. If a settlor
wishes to retain the flexibility to revoke, he should reserve the right
to do so directly in the trust instrument.1 2 s The benefits of abolishing the doctrine of worthier title should not be sacrificed on the altar of allowing improvident settlors to revoke trusts. The Appellate
Court of Illinois "paid a high price" to do so in Stewart's trust.2
C.

Instruments Effective before the Statute

For a time, cases will continue to arise requiring the interpretation of limitations to a grantor's heirs in instruments effective before
July 1, 1955, the effective date of the statute.'30 There is no reason
to continue to apply the doctrine of worthier title as to these cases
because no draftsman ever relied on the doctrine of worthier title to
change a remainder to his heirs into a reversion in himself.'
Furthermore, a lawyer interpreting an Illinois instrument effective
before 1955 would not reasonable rely upon the doctrine of worthier
127. A. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 109. See also Comment, The Illinois Doctrine of Worthier Title Revisited, 4 Nw. U.L. REV. 507, 517-18 (1953), arguing that
flexibility generally is offset by its effect on the settlor wishing to create a remainder
in his heirs.
128. Comment, supra note 127, at 517. In addition, the use of the doctrine may
be said to decrease the flexibility of the settlor since under the doctrine as applied in
Stewart the settlor will have to convince the court that he meant what he said. See
supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stewart.
129. Note, supra note 88, at 778.
130. This has happened twice to date: Warren Boynton State Bank v.
Wallbaum, 123 Ill. 2d 429, 528 N.E.2d 640 (1988); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Beach,
118 II. 2d 1, 513 N.E.2d 833 (1987).
131. Professor Gulliver states:
It is difficult to believe that worthier title may "reasonably be supposed to
have determined the conduct" of the settlor or his attorney. In certain areas of
the law of future interests, such as the rule against perpetuities, there is a special justification for stare decisis .... But it seems very doubtful that a lawyer
would rely on worthier title and insert what purported to be a gift to the settlor's heirs for the express purpose of reserving a reversion; the latter is easily
and traditionally accomplished by either making no disposition at the end of
the trust or by providing for return to the settlor personally.
A. GULLIVER, supra note 6, at 109-10.
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title.
As already discussed, there was no predictability of result where
some Illinois courts applied the doctrine as a rule of law, others as a
rule of construction, and still others did not apply it at all. Thus, in
the short run, while litigating pre-abolition cases, Illinois jurisprudence should follow the cases that ignored the doctrine and left the
remainder in the grantor's heirs where he put it. 32 Likewise, in the
long run, Illinois jurisprudence should apply the abolition statute to
totally abolish the doctrine of worthier title.
CONCLUSION

The feudal reasons for creating the doctrine have not existed for
centuries. The doctrine of worthier title and the Rule in Shelley's
case developed around the law of remainders only because of the
existence of feudal incidents. We no longer need to keep the fence
up around these interests after the reasons for doing so have long
since vanished. Remainders and executory interests were important
advancements in the common law. Now they should be allowed to
operate as their grantors intend that they should, and without the
"assistance" of the outmoded doctrine of worthier title.
The status of the doctrine of worthier title in Illinois is uncertain, although it need not be. The language of the statutory abolition read in light of the history of the doctrine compels the conclusion that the Illinois General Assembly intended that the doctrine
be completely abrogated. Further, there is little in the way of benefit
to justify the continued existence of such a confusing rule. It is time
to bury the dead.

132. Hubbard v. Buddemeier, 328 I1. 76, 159 N.E. 229 (1927); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 Ill. 248, 54 N.E. 918 (1899).

